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Abstract   Sales and distribution innovations have increased productivity in the salmon 
aquaculture industry. In this article, we investigate the use of fixed price contracts for 
Norwegian salmon exports to France based on all export transactions between the two 
countries. Our analysis shows that almost 25% of these exports were traded using fixed 
price contracts and contract prices were renegotiated at different intervals, including 
as infrequently as once a year. Some contracts allow the contracting parties to adjust 
contract prices when the export price moves significantly. Benchmark analysis, which 
shows a marginal 0.5% difference between average unit revenue for the year from spot 
sales relative to contract sales, indicates that contracts primarily change revenue time 
profiles. The use of contracts creates a wedge between salmon export prices and spot 
prices in periods of price volatility, which in turn reduces price transmission.
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Introduction
Salmon aquaculture is an ongoing success story, as production has increased from a 
few thousand tonnes in 1980 to around 1.4 million tonnes in 2009. Norway, with a 51% 
share of world production in 2009, is the world’s leading producer. There are two key 
factors that make this production growth profitable. The first is that significant produc-
tivity growth has reduced real production cost to less than 33% of the cost level of the 
early 1980s (Asche 1997, 2008; Tveteras 1999, 2002; Guttormsen 2002; Kumbhakar and 
Tveteras 2003; Asche, Roll, and Tveteras 2009; Nilsen 2010). The second is that system-
atic marketing, generic advertising, product development, and improved logistics have 
increased demand (Bjørndal, Salvanes, and Andreassen 1992; Asche 1996; Kinnucan et 
al. 2003; Kinnucan and Myrland 2005, 2007; Asche 2008; Xie, Kinnucan, and Myrland 
2009; Asche and Bjørndal 2011).
  The structure of the industry has changed over time, as it has grown from an owner-
operated industry of several hundred small single farm firms to a more integrated industry 
of fewer but larger firms (Kvaløy and Tveteras 2008). The industry consisted of more 
than 800 active firms in the mid 1980s. This had fallen to 186 active firms in 2008, with 
the four largest accounting for almost 50% of Norwegian production (Asche and Bjørndal 
2011). This change in industry structure has been driven by increased operating capital 
requirements and the search for economies of scale and scope in production and sales. Larsen and Asche 142
  Contracts are a tool designed to reduce risk and transaction costs. They provide the 
contracting parties with offsetting benefits and have a long history in agriculture and min-
eral markets (Kvaløy 2006). Industry sources indicate that the use of contracts in salmon 
farming has increased substantially in recent decades. Information about the use of con-
tracts and their details is not normally made public by the contracting parties. This makes 
the measurement of their dispersion difficult (Vukina and Zeng 2010), and our empirical 
knowledge is limited.
   In this article, we attempt to measure the use of contracts that fix prices over a period 
by examining price patterns in the Norwegian export data. The unusually large price varia-
tions in 2006 make this year an excellent one in which to examine to what extent fixed price 
contracts are used (see figures 1–4)1. The average export price for the first 5 weeks of 2006 
was close to 27 Norwegian kroner (NOK) per kilo before it started to increase. The price 
peaked in weeks 25–26 at about NOK 44 per kilo. The average price for the last 5 weeks of 
the year was close to NOK 28 per kilo, which is almost the same as for the first 5 weeks. 
  Our approach is unique and exploits the fact that we have access to data on each 
individual transaction carried out by every export firm. With this data structure, we can 
investigate whether prices for some transactions and for some firms have a unique pattern 
and deviate from the general price movement. The authors are not aware of any studies 
using a similar approach to identify a fixed price contract in general or studies on the use 
of contracts in the salmon aquaculture industry, with the exception of Dybvig and Tvere-
tas (2003), which is based on a survey. 
Contracts
Agricultural products have long production times and are often highly perishable. Be-
cause of this, the agriculture industry was one of the earliest to use short- and long-term 
contracts. Contracts are primarily used to reduce risk and transaction costs (Lafontaine 
and Slade forthcoming). Contracts restrict the actions of one or both parties, but at the 
same time provide offsetting benefits. A well functioning spot market allows agents to 
trade at competitive prices. Spot market trading does, however, result in volatile cash 
flows and can increase sales costs. These negative aspects can, at least partly, be mitigated 
using contracts. It is important to understand that contracts, while mitigating some risks, 
also introduce others, such as holdup (Kvaløy 2006), and that an exhaustive contract does 
not exist. The only way to obtain full control over several levels in the supply chain is to 
vertically integrate. Vertical integration completely removes transactional risk but also 
removes the efficiency created by competition. 
  Contract theory describes a number of different types of contract arrangements. La-
fontaine and Slade (forthcoming) indicate that it is common practice to contract on little 
else than price when products are fairly homogeneous and where production technology 
is well understood. Still, a price contract can incorporate a number of different arrange-
ments, such as linear pricing rules, market prices plus a fixed fee, or nonlinear pricing 
schemes, such as quantity discounts. None of the parties are, in general, expected to gain 
a price advantage by entering a contract. A contract is intended to reduce risk and transac-
tion costs, and contract prices should be an unbiased estimate of the spot price.
  Polinsky (1987) indicates that a spot price contract tends to insure a seller against 
production cost uncertainty and a buyer against valuation uncertainty, while a fixed 
price contract insures a seller against demand side uncertainties and a buyer against 
supply side uncertainties. Thus, which contract form preferred by the parties depends 
on their relative aversion to risk and the magnitude of the supply side and demand side 
1 The salmon market has repeatedly experienced exogenous shocks that lead to increased price volatility 
(Oglend and Sikveland 2008), the most recent being the disease problems in Chile (Asche et al. 2009).Contracts in Salmon Aquaculture 143
uncertainties. Exporter (seller) and importer (buyer) that are equally risk averse will, in 
general, share the risk. 
  Salmon aquaculture and agriculture have many aspects in common, such as long 
production times and perishable products, which provide similar a premise for contract-
ing. Industry sources state that a wide range of contracts are used in the salmon industry.2 
These contracts are said to primarily be used to achieve two objectives. The first is to 
regularize quantity flow, allowing better production planning for producers, better capac-
ity utilization in the supply chain, and reduction of quantity risk for both parties. Retail 
chains typically prequalify three to five suppliers that are able to guarantee to supply a 
minimum quantity that meets given quality parameters. The seller has no guarantee that 
the retail chain will purchase the total quantity that is guaranteed, but in most cases the 
purchase of a minimum quantity is guaranteed. The second objective is to reduce price 
volatility.3 This is achieved in numerous ways, including linking the price to some market 
price, possibly after reducing the variation by a given formula and fixing the price for 
shorter or longer periods of time. One relatively common practice is a contract that speci-
fies a base price and a bound around this with a reference price. If the reference price only 
moves within the bound, the base price is paid. However, if the reference price moves 
beyond the bound, then the base price is adjusted for the difference between the bound 
and the reference price. The longest fixed price contract the authors are aware of is one in 
which the price is renegotiated once a year.
Data and Methods
The main objective of this article is to provide empirical evidence of the utilization of 
contracts to reduce price risk through examining Norwegian salmon exports. We will, 
consequently, not be examining all contracts, but focus only on cases with a price pattern 
that deviates sufficiently from the average export price such that this deviation is detect-
able. Norway’s foreign trade statistics are generated from customs’ documents submitted 
at the time of export. The authors were given access to the customs database for salmon 
that contains detailed transactional data on all salmon exports from Norway in 2006. 
Each transaction or observation in the data contains a product ID (from the Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System); export date; transport ID (e.g., truck, ship, 
train); delivery term ID (e.g., FOB, DDP); net value; quantity; currency; and exchange 
rate, if the domestic currency was not used; import country ID; and export firm ID. The 
firm level data was organized as panel data, with individual firms being the panel ID vari-
able and date being the time ID variable. 
  Farmed salmon, HS03021201 (fresh, whole, and gutted), is considered to be a fairly 
homogenous product. The firm level data on farmed salmon shows great variation on a 
daily basis.4 Price variations are mainly due to variations in product size, the most impor-
tant quality attribute. However, this cannot be tested using our data, as the trade statistics 
do not differentiate between weight classes. There are systematic differences in price lev-
els between countries. We therefore focus on a single market to reduce price variations to 
the greatest extent possible. France has been the most important market for fresh Norwe-
gian salmon for many years and was selected as the focus of our analysis. The firm level 
data contained 9,267 observations, with an average of 178 observations per week. There 
were 43 unique export firms in the data, the 12 largest accounting for more than 92% of 
exports. Fifteen firms exported fresh salmon to France once a week or more, on average. 
2 The authors have followed the industry closely in recent years and have conducted five interviews specifically 
for this research.
3 Price volatility has been increasing in the salmon market (Oglend and Sikveland 2008).
4 This is as expected, as there are significant quality differences for salmon, and the price varies with these char-
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  As noted above, substantial variation in the annual price pattern of 2006 makes it 
an ideal year for searching for fixed price trades. We define price contracting as a short- 
or long-term agreement between a Norwegian exporter and a French importer to trade 
farmed salmon at a price that is fixed for a period of time. Successive transactions that 
lie within a specified price range or interval are identified by the analysis. Preliminary 
analysis suggests that an interval of NOK 0.25 or €0.03, depending upon whether the 
contract is denoted in NOK or Euro, is sufficient to identify contracts. Frequency tables 
and histograms were then used to identify intervals that contained a series of trades at a 
given price interval for each firm. We divided the dataset into two groups, one of mostly 
rising prices (weeks 1–25) and one of mostly falling prices (weeks 26–52). This was car-
ried out to avoid similar prices early in the year and late in the year being included within 
the same intervals. Identification was made easier by high transaction series regularity in 
a given interval (e.g., transactions carried out on the same day each week) and because 
the quantity of each transaction was often the same. 
Empirical Results
Only relatively large firms that trade frequently can be identified as having used price 
contracts. This means that the 15 firms that make at least one trade a week, on average, 
are of greatest interest. We identified 7 of these 15 firms as those that used contracts with 
fixed prices for some transactions. One firm only used fixed prices, while another firm 
used fixed prices for 60% of its exports, measured by quantity. A third firm made around 
33% of its exports at fixed prices, whereas the remaining four firms traded nearly 17% 
of their exports at fixed prices. These seven firms accounted for 75% of the total export 
quantity, which is an indication that large firms are more likely to use price contracts than 
small firms. We identified 17,109 out of 76,238 tonnes that were exported at fixed prices, 
equivalent to 22.4% of exports to France.
  We will present graphic representations of the transactions of three firms to illustrate 
the extent to which contracts are used. The solid line (all figures) represents the average 
daily export price for all firms. 
  Firm 1 accounted for around 3% of total Norwegian exports of fresh salmon to France 
in 2006, which makes it a medium-sized exporter. Figure 1 is a bubble chart that shows 
firm 1’s daily export activity in 2006. Note that the bubbles that indicate prices and the 
corresponding dates are weighted by the quantity. The smallest bubbles represent around 
0.5 tonnes, while the largest bubbles represent almost 20 tonnes, which is equivalent to 
a full truck load. Firm 1’s average daily export quantity was approximately nine tonnes. 
Please note that there can be several observations or export transactions on a single day 
but that there are not transactions on all days. We cannot identify any fixed price exports 
from figure 1. Firm 1 was therefore categorized as a firm that only used spot prices, which 
is confirmed by the correspondence between the bubbles and the average export price. 
  Firm 2 was one of the largest exporters, accounting for 9% of the total Norwegian 
export of fresh salmon to France in 2006. Figure 2 shows that firm 2 used a mix of spot 
and fixed prices. The fixed/spot price mix was 60/40 by quantity. There appears to be one 
set of contract sales at fixed prices in the range NOK 25–26 or €3.3 per kilo throughout 
the year, and another set of contracts with fixed prices in the range NOK 32–33 or €4.0 per 
kilo throughout the second half of the year. The quantities sold at fixed prices, which are 
indicated by bubble size, were large and stable. The average quantity for fixed price trans-
actions was 18 tonnes, while the average quantity for spot price contracts was 17 tonnes. 
  An important question is whether a firm loses or gains due to its contracting strategy. 
In order to assess such a question, we performed a benchmark analysis investigating how 
firm 2’s revenue compares to the industry average. This was conducted by multiplying 
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export price, providing a benchmark revenue. An indication of the firm’s performance can 
then be found by comparing the benchmark revenue to the actual revenue obtained. We 
find that firm 2 lost significantly on its contract strategy, as the benchmark revenue was 

























Firm Price Average Export Price
Figure 1.  Firm 1’s 2006 Daily Exports
Note: Solid line represents the average export price for all firms.
  Firm 3 accounted for around 6% of total Norwegian exports of fresh salmon to 
France in 2006. Figure 3 shows a trading pattern which is very different from that of 
the other firms. It appears that firm 3 traded using only fixed price contracts. The prices 
appear to be adjusted to the export price every quarter, with the exception of the third 
quarter, which seems to be cut somewhat short, perhaps due to the rapid declining export 
price. The equally sized bubbles indicate a fairly stable almost daily export quantity of 
around 18 tonnes. The benchmark analysis for firm 3 shows that the contract strategy had 
little effect on the firm’s performance. The benchmark revenue was 0.5% higher than the 
actual revenue. Statistically, we cannot reject the hypothesis that this firm obtained export 








































Firm Price (fixed) Firm price (spot) Average Export Price
Figure 2.  Firm 2’s 2006 Daily Exports









































Figure 3.  Firm 3’s 2006 Daily Exports
Note: Solid line represents the average export price for all firms.Contracts in Salmon Aquaculture 147
  We have shown that the aggregated export price in 2006 was generated by a mix of 
fixed contract prices and spot prices. This implies that the spot market price is not neces-
sarily represented by the export price, as fixed contract prices can limit or delay export 
price movements. We can test to what extent this is the case using the data made available 
to us. We split the data set in two to investigate this issue. One set of observations con-
tained no evidence of fixed price contracts. We label those as the synthetic spot price. The 
other set contained the remaining sales that we identified as having been made at fixed 
prices—the contract price. 
  We tested the difference between these prices and the export price using a classic two 
sample mean-comparison t-test with unequal variances. We investigated whether the pric-
es were different throughout the entire year and in each quarter using aggregated weekly 
data. The following null hypotheses were specified: 
  (A: Export vs. spot)                    0 :
E S
t t H P P   
   (B: Export vs. contract)        0 : ,
E C
t t H P P 
where PE is the export price, PS is the synthetic spot price, and PC is the contract price. 
The t subscript denotes weeks. The results are reported in table 1. We cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the export price and the synthetic spot price are equal when we use 
weekly data for the whole year. However, figure 4 indicates there are greater differences 
between prices in the second and last quarters compared to the first and third. We there-
fore conduct quarterly comparisons instead of annual. In these tests, we can reject the null 
hypothesis in the second and fourth quarters. This implies that the synthetic spot price 
and the export price were significantly different in these quarters. The average difference 
is close to NOK 1.7 per kilo in the second quarter and about NOK 0.8 per kilo in the 
fourth quarter. 
  We observe from figure 4 that the synthetic spot price increase seems to be steeper 
than the increase in the export price. This is probably due to the lag caused by the sticky 
fixed prices. Figures 1 and 2 show sales at prices well above the average export price at 
the time when the export price peaked. This suggests that the spot market price was actu-
ally higher than the NOK 43–44 per kilo indicated by the export price. 
  The industry’s export value was almost NOK 2.5 billion in 2006, equivalent to about 
300 million Euros at an exchange rate of NOK 8/€. We conducted benchmark analysis 
on the industry level, resulting in benchmark revenues being NOK 13.6 million or 0.5% 
higher than the actual revenue obtained. Statistically, we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
firms’ contract strategies caused industry revenues to neither drop nor rise. 
  Figure 4 also shows contract quantity as a proportion of total export quantity. There 
appears to be an inverse relationship between export price and quantity. Only 10% of 
fresh salmon was exported at fixed prices in weeks 25–26, when export prices exceeded 
NOK 40 per kilo. Up to 33% of exports were traded at fixed prices in the weeks before 
and after this, when prices were lower. At least two important insights can be derived 
from this relationship. Firstly, a few firms did trade using fixed price contracts throughout 
2006, even when export prices exceeded NOK 40 per kilo. The prices in some of these 
contracts were fixed around NOK 25–26 per kilo. This confirms that some firms were 
tied to long-term contracts lasting for at least one year and that some of these contracts 
were independent of the prevailing export or spot price. Secondly, many contracts appear 
to stop shortly after export prices start to increase sharply, and many contracts appear 
to start shortly after the export price starts to fall in June. This can indicate that some 
contract prices are renegotiated at a frequency that is greater than annually. The strong 
inverse relationship between export price and contract quantity proportion in figure 4 also 
indicates that a substantial proportion of contracts have a price bound that was exceeded Larsen and Asche 148
by the strong price movement. We were unable to continue tracking these prices as con-
tracts when the export price moved beyond this bound. We were, however, able to track 




                                                                        Hypothesis A                                          Hypothesis B
Annual  –0.318  2.617*
  
Q1  –0.113  0.727
Q2  –1.347  9.809*
Q3  –0.220  1.452
Q4  2.416*  –6.998*
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Concluding Remarks
The structure of the salmon industry has changed as it has grown, improving com-
petitiveness. Developments include improved production technology, more efficient 
logistics and distribution, and an increased product range. One element in this devel-
opment is the use of contracts to regulate the sales process in order to reduce risk and 
transaction costs. Obtaining information on contract sales is often difficult, as it is often 
considered to be sensitive. 
  In this article, we use a somewhat unconventional approach to investigate the pric-
ing format of actual exports of Norwegian salmon to France. This approach implies that 
we identify only contracts with fixed pricing schemes. Our approach is made possible 
by receiving access to all Norwegian export transactions to France in 2006, identified 
by firm. Furthermore, there were very large price variations in 2006, which makes it 
possible to identify sequences of sales at stable prices in a period that deviates from the 
main price pattern. 
  We find that almost 25% of actual sales were conducted using a contract in which 
the price is fixed for a period of time. The data also indicates that contract prices are re-
negotiated at a number of different frequencies, including once a year. The fact that the 
proportion of sales at fixed prices is reduced when the price increases rapidly is also an 
indication that many of the contracts fix price in a range, but follow the export price or 
are renegotiated when price volatility becomes high. The proportion of sales that used a 
contract with a pricing formula is significantly higher than the 25% that used fixed prices. 
  Benchmarking contract sales against sales using the average export price shows 
that annual revenue is neither significantly higher nor lower than expected. Fixed price 
contracts primarily change the profile of revenue flows. It is also important to note 
that the use of contracts creates a wedge between the export price and the spot price 
for salmon in periods of high price variation, reducing price transmission. Finally, the 
contract and spot sales currency mix might create additional variation and cause in-
complete exchange rate pass through, reducing price transmission (Asche and Tveterås 
2008; Larsen and Kinnucan 2009). 
  This study indicates that a substantial proportion of Norwegian salmon sales to 
France are conducted using fixed price contracts and provides some insight into the use 
of contracts with a fixed price. This, however, only covers a portion of contract sales, and 
further research is required to obtain a full understanding of the use of contracts in the 
Norwegian salmon industry.
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